We give an abstraction of verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. This abstraction is formalized within the applied pi-calculus by using an equational theory which characterizes the cryptographic semantics of secret share. We also present an encoding from the equational theory into a convergent rewriting system, which is suitable for the automated protocol verifier ProVerif. Based on that, we verify the threshold certificate protocol in ProVerif.
Introduction
pi-calculus are now widely considered a particularly salient approach for formally analyzing security protocols. 1 One of the central challenges in the analysis of complex and industrial-size protocols is the expressiveness of the formalism used in the formal analysis and its capability to model complex cryptographic operations. While such protocols traditionally relied only on the basic cryptographic operations such as encryption and digital signatures, modern cryptography has invented more sophisticated primitives with unique security features that go far beyond the traditional understanding of cryptography to solely offer secrecy and authenticity of a communication. Secret share constitutes such a prominent primitive. In 1994, Dawson et al. 12 proposed multi-secret sharing (MSS) schemes. In such schemes, several secrets can be shared during one secret-sharing process. 15 proposed a practical verifiable multi-secret sharing based on YCH schemes. 16 These unique security features that secret shares offer combined with the possibility to efficiently implement some of these proofs have paved these proofs the way to constitute very powerful building blocks for the construction of sophisticated cryptographic protocol. In a verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme with threshold (l, t), we have a set of l players, indexed 1, ..., l, and a trusted dealer. There is also a share verification algorithm and a share combining algorithm. In the dealing phase, the dealer takes messages which can be called dealer parameters as input and generates secret keys SK 1 , ..., SK l and verification keys VK 1 , ..., VK l . After the dealing phase, the dealer or player i can take as input messages which are called player parameters, along with the secret key SK i assigned by dealer, and generate secret share D i . Besides, the share verification algorithm takes secret share D i and verification key VK i as input messages to determine if the secret share D i is valid. The share combining algorithm takes as input messages t valid secret shares and output a secret. A secret is a message or a sequence of messages that can be built upon dealer parameters and player parameters through basic cryptographic operations.
Compared with the single-secret sharing schemes, the verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes have the following security features:
• It allows the constructing of several secrets in parallel and the computation is efficient; • It is multi-use (once the secret has been constructed, it is not necessary for the dealer to redistribute a fresh secret share over a security channel to every player); • It allows the participant to verify the validity of secret shares of the other participants. Due to the complexity of verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes, it is very difficult to devise the abstraction of secret-sharing proofs. In 1999, Yew et al. 18 defined an abstraction of single-secret sharing schemes in Coq, which is based on a clear separation between the modeling of reliable participants and that of the adversary. But this definition is too simple to hold all the security features of verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes above. [9] [10] [11] Our main contributions are as follows: We give an abstraction of verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes within the applied pi-calculus 4 by using an equational theory which characterizes the cryptographic semantics of secret shares. Based on that, we transform our abstraction into a convergent rewriting system, which is suitable for ProVerif 17 , a well-established tool for the mechanized analysis of different security properties. We express cryptographic protocols in the applied picalculus. We devise an equational theory that characterizes the semantic properties of secret shares, and that allows for abstract operation about such proofs. The design of the theory guarantees the soundness and the completeness of verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes with threshold (l, t) as well as the actual secret shares' properties: First, it is impossible or at least computationally infeasible, to produce any secret with knowledge of any t−1 or fewer valid secret shares. On the other hand, knowledge of any t or more valid secret shares makes all the secrets easily computable. ProVerif 17 constitutes a well-established automated protocol verifier based on Horn clauses resolution that allows for the verification of observational equivalence and of different trace-based security properties such as authenticity. We present a mechanized encoding of our equational theory into a convergent rewriting system that ProVerif can efficiently cope with. We prove that the encoding preserves observational equivalence. In this paper, we review the applied pi-calculus in section 2. Section 3 contains the equational theory for abstract operation about verifiable multi-secret sharing in the applied pi-calculus. This equational theory is rewritten into an equivalent finite theory in terms of a convergent rewriting system in section 4. Section 5 elaborates on the analysis of the threshold certificate protocol, the description of its security properties.
Review of The Applied Pi-calculus
The syntax of the applied pi-calculus 3 is given as follows. Terms are defined by means of a signature Σ, which consists of a set of function symbols, each with an arity. The set of terms T Σ is the free algebra built from names, variables, and function symbols in Σ applied to arguments. We let m range over names and variables. Terms are equipped with an equational theory E, i.e., an equivalence relation on terms that is closed under substitution of terms and under application of term contexts (terms with a hole). We write E M N = for an equality, modulo E. The grammar of processes (or plain processes) is defined as follows. The null process 0 does nothing; The restriction process .
n P generates a fresh name n and then behaves as P; The conditional process if M = N then P else Q behaves as P if E M N = , and as Q otherwise; The input process u(x).P receives a message N from the channel u and then behaves as P{N/x}; The output process ( ).
u N P outputs the message N on the channel u and then behaves as P; The replication process P | Q executes P and Q in parallel; !P generates an unbounded number of copies of P. A context is a process or an extended process with a hole. An evaluation context is a context without private function symbols whose hole is not under a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output process. A context
As in the pi-calculus, the semantics is defined in terms of structural equivalence ( º ) and internal reduction ( ® ). Structural equivalence states which processes should be considered equivalent up to syntactic rearrangement. Internal reduction defines the semantics for extended processes. 
is the smallest relation on extended processes that satisfies the rules in Table 2 and that is closed under structural equivalence and under application of evaluation contexts. 
We write P ß u to denote that process P can send a message on channel u. Observational equivalence (») constitutes an equivalence relation that captures the equivalence of processes with respect to their dynamic behavior.
Definition 3.
Observational equivalence ( » ) is the largest symmetric relation between closed extended processes with the same domain such that P Q implies:
3. An Equational Theory of Secret-sharing
An underlying cryptographic base theory
The base equational theory E base we consider in this paper is given in Table 3 . In E base , function ntuples is for constructing the tuple of n messages; enc sym , dec sym , enc asym , and dec asym are for encrypting and decrypting messages by symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, respectively; sign and check are for signing messages and verifying signatures; pk is for modeling public key and h is for hashing. We encode numbers in binary form via the functions string 0 , string 1 , and empty (e.g., a bitstring 10 would be encoded as string 1 (string 0 (empty)). Arithmetic operations are modeled as destructors. For instance, the greater-equal relation is defined by the destructor ge(M 1 , M 2 ), which returns true if M 1 is greater equal then M 2 . With this encoding, numbers and cryptographic messages are disjoint sets of values. In our example theory, infix notation is used for the functions eq, Ù , and Ú , which model equality test, conjunction, and disjunction. 
eq(x, x) = true. ge(string 1 (empty)), string 0 (empty))) = true.
Illustrative example
A (l, t)-threshold signatures scheme is a protocol that allows any subset of t players out of l to generate a signature, but that disallows the creation of a valid signature if fewer than t players participate in the protocol 11 .
The equational theory for secret-sharing
Our equational theory E base for abstract operations about secret-sharing and its components are explained in the following. Secret-sharing process with threshold (l, t) is represented as a term of the form , ( ) l t SSP t , name t is used to identify specified secret-sharing process, we abuse notation by writing 
F , while natural number m, called the proof's identity Id, can be used to identify specified secret key in secret-sharing process and we have mÎ [1, l] ; Further, the secret share is represented as a term of the form 
F , the corresponding verification key for secret share is represented as a term of form
F and we have mÎ [1, l] . Verification of secret shares with respect to verification key for secret share is modeled as a function , , i j k SVer of arity k+2 that is defined by the following equational rule:
Combination of r secret shares with respect to (i, j)-functions is modeled as function , , , i j k r SCombin of arity r+k that is defined by the following equational rule:
These rules guarantee in the abstract model the soundness and the completeness of the verifiable multisecret sharing schemes with threshold (l, t) as well as the actual secret share properties that knowledge of any t−1 or fewer valid secret shares leaves the secret completely undetermined and knowledge of any t or more valid secret shares makes the secret easily computable.
Towards a Mechanized Analysis of Secretsharing
The equational theory E SS defined in the previous section is not suitable for existing tools for mechanized security protocol analysis. The reason is that the number of possible (i, j)-functions, and thus the number of equational rules in E SS , is infinite. Hence, it is very difficult to devise the abstraction of secret-sharing proofs possibly generated by the environment, which represents the adversary with various capabilities. In this section, we specify an equivalent equational theory in terms of a convergent rewriting system. This theory turns out to be suitable for Proverif, a well established tool for mechanized verification of different security properties of cryptographic protocol specified in a variant of the applied pi-calculus. 
A finite specification of secret-sharing
The central idea of our finite equivalent theory is to focus on the secret-sharing proofs used within the process specification and to abstract away from the additional ones that are possibly generated by the environment. This makes finite the specification of the equational theory. First, we track secret shares generated or combined in the process specification by a set TR of tetrads of the form (i, j, k, F ), where F is sequence of k (i, j)-functions of secret-sharing schemes. Second, we record h, which is the largest threshold of secret-sharing schemes used in the process specification. For term M and process P, we let terms(M) denote the set of subterms of M and terms(P) denote the set of terms in P.
We can now formally define the notion of (TR, h)-validity of terms and processes.
Definition 5. A term Z is (TR, h)-valid if and only if the following conditions hold:
(i) For every
process P is (TR, h)-valid if and only if M is (TR, h)-valid for every MÎ terms(P).
We check that each secret share generation, verification and combination is tracked in TR (i). We also check that the secret can be divided into at most h different secret shares in the process specification (iii).
Compilation into finite form
It now remains to encode the secret-sharing proofs generated by the environment. These proofs are possibly different from the ones specified in the process. We include in , TR h SS å the function symbols , ,
. We then replace every term 
SCombin
, it can be omitted from the protocol specification. For combination of different secret shares in (TR, h)-valid form, which are with the same secret in the same (l, t)-threshold secret-sharing process, it suffices to check whether the arity of secret shares is more that t. Thus, we include in , , ,
is used to determine if the secret can be computable from r different secret shares in a secret-sharing scheme with threshold (l, t) and can be modeled as follows.
, , ,
for r 1
, , ,1
Thus, combination of r different secret shares is modeled by the following equational rules:
, , , functions are private, hence they cannot be used by the adversary. We now define the dynamic compilation of term and process. 
Definition 6. The (TR, h)-dynamic compilation is the partial function
x = x; n = n, where
The following theorem finally states that observational equivalence is preserved under dynamic compilation and hence asserts the soundness of the encoding from the infinite specification into the finite specification.
Theorem 1. Let P and Q be (TR, h)-valid processes, and s be the (TR, h)-dynamic compilation, we have that Ps
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix.
Mechanized Analysis of Threshold Certificate Protocol
We then analyze the security properties of (l, t)-threshold certificate protocol 17 with
The goal of threshold certificate protocol is to enable secret-sharing scheme to resist player's cheating. Each player gets secret share and a (l, t)-threshold agreement certificate in share distributing phase of the proposed secret-sharing scheme. The (l, t)-threshold agreement certificate can prevent the leakage of the secret share and can be verified. Thus, any player who submits a false certificate will be detected. And, no information about the secret shares can be computed from the cheating. The threshold certificate protocol is composed of three subprotocols: the secret distributing protocol, the secret reconstruction protocol and the secret recovering protocol. The secret distributing protocol allows players and off-line TTP to get secret share and (l, t)-threshold agreement certificate from dealer. The secret reconstruction protocol enables more than t players to reconstruct the secret. The recovering protocol enables more than t players and off-line TTP to recover the secret. Every Player has a unique ID. Off-line TTP also has a group of special IDs. We assume further dealer has a key-pair called endorsement key (EK) for each secretsharing scheme as well as a publicly known identity bsn D . , sign(ttpss i , SK) ) is called the (l, t)-threshold agreement certificate of the player ID i . In our calculus, we can model the dealer in the secret distributing protocol according to as follow.
Secret distributing protocol
define ssproof = sign(beta1, alpha1).
Here the define statement defines an abbreviation ssproof for the (i, j)-function we use in all secret-sharing proofs.
Secret reconstruction protocol
After successfully executing the secret distributing protocol, each player gets secret share and a (l, t)-threshold agreement certificate from dealer. Players If the number of the certificates which pass the verification is less than t, then they stop the procedure according to the (l, t)-threshold access structure. Otherwise, they perform the following steps. (iii) Each player submits her/his secret share ( (h(N D ), SK) . The process for the secret reconstruction protocol is reported as follow. obtain (s).
. is used to decide if at least t different (l, t)-threshold agreement certificates pass the verification of ID i .
Secret recovering protocol
Suppose that some of the players don' t submit their (l, t)-threshold secret shares. The remaining players may send {( N D ), SK) . The process for the secret recovering protocol is reported as follow. 
Authenticity of the protocol
We will now discuss the authenticity property of the threshold certificate protocol and how to model it in our calculus. Firstly, we can define this protocol as follow:
The security goal of threshold certificate protocol is to enable secret-sharing scheme to resist player's cheating. Thus, any player who submits a false certificate will be detected. And, no information about the secret shares can be computed from the cheating. GS(ID G , ID j , t) is defined to include all the sets which contain t elements different from ID j in ID G . Thus, the authenticity property of threshold certificate protocol is defined as the fulfillment of the following trace properties: (ID x , s) respectively. ProVerif shows that the threshold certificate protocol satisfies the authenticity property.
Conclusion
We devise an abstraction of verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes in the applied pi-calculus. An equational theory for terms characterizes the semantic properties of secret share. Moreover, we propose an encoding into a finite specification in terms of a convergent rewriting system that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. We regard the threshold certificate protocol as the case study, because this protocol packages many ideas that appear in the field of secret-sharing. Furthermore, this case study contributes to the results for the specification and verification of verifiable multi-secret sharing protocol that should be useful beyond the analysis of the threshold certificate protocol.
Definition 7
The set of execution traces of an extended process P, written traces(P), is defined as follows:
In the following, we let s range over execution traces. We then review the notions which come from [3] . We now define the notion of labeled bisimilarity 3 , which constitutes an equivalent notion of observational equivalence. Labeled bisimilarity does not rely on the universal quantification over evaluation contexts used in the definition of observational equivalence. 
Definition 10
Proof. We prove the Ü implication by induction on the length of the derivation of M 1 . We first discuss the interesting base case: 
The proof of the implication is similar. Notice that internal reduction is closed by structural equivalence. It is easy to see that P 2 {M / x} is (TR，h)-valid since M occurs in the (TR，h)-valid process a (M We have that A B.
Lemma 2 let A be an extended process such that
A SS E º v n .v y .({ M / x }| P), for some (TR, h)-valid extended process v n .v y .({ M / x }| P),.v y.({ ' M / ' x }| ' P ) SS E º B such that v n.v y .({ M / x}| P) s , TR h SS E ® v n .v y. ({ ' M / ' x }| ' P ) s .
